The limited liability company (LLC) is
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I. Introduction
Limited liability companies (LLCs) are a much more popular business entity in some states than in others. For instance, people in Connecticut form twelve times as many LLCs than corporations each year. In contrast, more corporations than LLCs are still formed in Illinois, New York, and California. This empirical study provides the first detailed analysis of the state-to-state variation of LLC popularity, using a partly original set of cross-sectional state-level data. I find that LLCs are more popular in those states in which the fees for organizing an LLC are lower than the fees for organizing a corporation, and vice versa. These formation fee differentials, which are highly visible at the moment the business entity is formed, explain more of the variation in LLC popularity than all other factors taken together. In contrast, differentials in annual fees and state entitylevel taxes do not explain the variation. I also found only weak evidence that the popularity of the LLC is associated with different substantive rules contained in state LLC statutes. However, LLCs are more popular in those states whose LLC statutes expressly endorse the principle of contractual freedom than in those that lack such a provision. Finally, I found no evidence that LLC popularity is related to different levels of uniformity of LLC statutes, the age of LLC statutes, and other factors. Figure 1 illustrates how the popularity of the LLC varies across the 50 states and the District of Columbia. I measure LLC popularity in three different ways. My first measurement is the ratio of new domestic LLCs to new domestic business or professional corporations formed in the most recent year available. The second measurement has a broader denominator, which comprises all other domestic entities that provide for limited liability, namely corporations, limited partnerships (LPs), limited liability partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs). The third measurement is different from the first in that its denominator includes not only domestic corporations, but also corporations from other states that have registered to do business in the respective state. By all three measurements, the popularity of the LLC varies substantially from state to state. The highest ratio of LLCs to domestic corporations is 17.7 times higher than the 4 lowest. 1 The highest ratio of LLCs to other limited liability entities is 16.3 times higher than the lowest, 2 and the highest ratio of LLCs to corporations including out-of-state corporations is still 11.6 times higher than the lowest. The differences in popularity of the LLC have been remarkably persistent over time. Figure 2 shows how LLC-to-corporations ratios (the first of the three measurements introduced above) have changed across the 50 states and D.C. between 1999 and 2009. In that period, the median LLC-to-corporations ratio increased from 0.70 to 2.77. The gap between the state whose LLC-to-corporations ratio is at the lowest quartile 4 and the state whose LLC-to-corporations ratio is at the highest quartile has widened correspondingly. : 1999: n=40; 2000: n=47; 2001: n=47; 2002: n=50; 2003: n=48; 2004: n=46; 2005: n=50; 2006: n=45; 2007: n=43; 2008: n=31; 2009: n=40. 
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4 I use quartiles and not the highest and lowest LLC-to-corporations ratios in Figure 2 because not all states have not reported data for each year and quartiles are less sensitive to missing values than the highest and lowest values. A year-by-year comparison of the highest and the lowest values would have said more about which states had not submitted a report than about the long-term trends in LLC-to-corporations ratios.
6
The business entity of the LLC was designed to be popular. Forty-nine jurisdictions enacted LLC laws between 1990 and 1997, 6 and virtually all state legislatures wanted the LLC to be a business-friendly entity that would attract business and revenue to the state. 7 Indeed, since 2004, when LLC formations surpassed incorporations for the first time, the LLC is the most popular business entity in the United States. 8 The numbers of LLC formations are impressive. From 2004 to 2007, the latest period for which complete data are available, 4.9 million LLCs were formed nationwide, compared to 3.3 million corporations and 0.2 million limited partnerships. 9 However, as Figure 1 shows, the LLC is not equally popular in all U.S. states.
In an empirical study from 2001, Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi found that LLC-to-LLP ratios vary considerably across states.
10
They explained this variation with differences in income taxation, among other things. INQUIRY 464, 472-473 (1996). 7 Professor Goforth summarized the motives for enacting LLC laws as follows: "In virtually every state, those responsible for drafting and/or enacting LLC legislation cite motives which relate to attracting business and revenue to the state … . In many instances, the speed with which LLC legislation has been implemented is due at least in part to an express desire not to be left behind as neighboring or competing jurisdictions authorized the new business form." Carol R. States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193 , 1272 (1995 (references omitted). For a detailed overview of the legislative history of the LLC see id. at 1222-1262. Chrisman, supra note 8, at 476. 10 See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 121-127 and app. at 130-134 and 138 (2001) (reporting LLC-to-LLP ratios for each state for the years 1993 through 1999 and performing a regression analysis showing that LLC-to-LLP ratios are lower in those states that tax LLCs adversely, in those four states that have a very long LLC statute, and in those states in which LLP members are fully shielded from liability). 7 number of business formations varies widely from state to state.
Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race Between the
12
He examined the six states that had the lowest percentage of LLCs to total business formations at the time, and he surmised that this was due to fee and franchise tax differentials, unfavorable state tax treatment and-in two cases-inaccurate reporting of filing statistics.
13
In 2006, Miller, Greenberg and Greenberg calculated the LLCto-corporations ratios of seven states and postulated that the differences in their results were driven by some states' unfavorable treatment of the LLC, such as cumbersome filing procedures and highly regulated statutes.
14 Closely related to this study is a strand of empirical literature on the choices of formation state by closely held companies.
15
Professors Dammann and Schündeln studied the formation choices of LLCs with twenty or more employees and found that these companies are more likely to be formed outside the state of their primary place of business if the state of their primary place of business does not allow LLC members to trigger the dissolution of the company in case of oppression, or if it does not shield LLCs from veil piercing for the mere failure to observe formalities.
16
In a similar study, Professors Kobayashi In a study of the incorporation choices of closely held corporations, Dammann and Schündeln found that corporations with more than 1,000 employees are more likely to be formed out of state if court quality in the state of their primary place of business is low, the risk of veil piercing is high in that state, or if its corporate statute has a high level of minority protection or permits waivers of the duty of care.
19
To explore potential explanations of the state-to-state variation in LLC popularity, I performed regression analyses of a partly original dataset of crosssectional state-level data on business formations in the fifty United States and the District of Columbia.
I find that LLCs are more popular in those states in which the fees for organizing an LLC are lower than the fees for organizing a corporation, and less popular in those states in which the fees for organizing an LLC are higher than the fees for organizing a corporation.
20
Formation fee differentials account for 17% to 28% of the variation in LLC popularity. Their explanatory power is greater than the explanatory power of all other variables taken together.
Paradoxically, LLC popularity is not associated with differentials in recurring fees (such as annual report fees) and franchise taxes, although these differentials tend to be greater than the formation fee differentials.
I find only weak evidence that substantive rules contained in LLC statutes explain some of the variation in LLC popularity.
21
I do find that LLCs are more popular in those states in which LLC members have a right to withdraw from and receive their share in the company, unless they agree otherwise. Beyond that, the data show no connection between the variation in LLC popularity and substantive rules relating to the protection of minority LLC members or of third parties, and to the fiduciary duties of LLC members and managers. Likewise, the popularity of the LLC is unrelated to the prevalence of particular mandatory rules or the content of select default rules that presumably suit the needs of small companies. Thus, the importance of state-to-state differences in substantive LLC law should not be overrated when comparing aggregate business filing statistics. 18 9 I also find that LLCs are more popular in those states whose statutes expressly provide that "maximum effect" shall be given to the principle of "freedom of contract."
22
The respective variable is highly robust and explains about 10% of the variation in LLC popularity. If this is not a result by chance, it could be viewed as evidence that "freedom of contract" provisions reassure firms that courts will not rewrite their LLC contracts in case of a lawsuit. Alternatively, "freedom of contract" provisions might be associated with other popular features of LLC statutes.
Finally, the variation in LLC popularity cannot be explained by the following factors: The degree to which LLC statutes are uniform; whether a state has adopted the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) or the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA); the age of LLC statutes; whether a state permits the formation of series LLCs; and whether a state limits the rights of creditors of LLC members to those of an assignee of the member's financial interest in the company.
23
In addition, California is the only state to prohibit LLCs from providing professional services. This might explain that state's exceptionally low LLC-to-corporations ratio.
24
I proceed as follows: In Part II, I explain the data and the methodology. In Part III, I discuss my findings and their implications. In Part IV, I discuss directions for future research. In Part V, I conclude the paper.
II. Data and Methodology
To explain the variation in LLC popularity, I performed ordinary least-square regressions using a partly original dataset of cross-sectional state-level data with 51 observations (50 states plus D.C.). The dataset is posted on the data repository of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).
25
My dependent variables are based on the three measurements of LLC popularity introduced at the beginning of this study. Not all filing offices submit a report every year, and there are some inconsistencies and errors in 27 The formula for calculating the dependent variables is:
whereas DV is the value of the dependent variable, i is the state for which the value of the dependent variable is calculated, R is the measurement of LLC popularity used, and y is the year of observation. It was necessary to log the dependent variables to render the regression residuals normal. 11 the data as well.
29
I complemented the IACA data and corrected errors, to the extent possible, by filing statistics published by the individual filing offices on their websites.
30
Until 2006, filing offices reported their data to the IACA twice: once as of the actual report year, and a year later as previous year data. This allowed me to detect discrepancies between the data for a given year. These discrepancies were mostly marginal and may be due to revisions of filing data by the filing office. The data used to calculate the dependent variables may contain some modest errors, but these data are the most accurate and complete data compiled to date.
Since not all filing offices submit a report every year, I used data from the most recent year available. For instance, filing offices sometimes reported the total number of entities on file instead of yearly filings. These errors can be detected because of their magnitude. Additionally, some jurisdictions include nonprofit corporations in their filing statistic for business and professional corporations. These cases are flagged in the reports. They affect the dependent variables only marginally because these data were only used to calculate the denominator of the dependent variables, median(R y ) (see supra note 27). None of the data used to calculate the numerator of the dependent variables, R iy (see supra note 27), included nonprofit corporations. A word is warranted here about the number of variables and the construction of the regression models. A study of the relationship between the popularity of the LLC and state law faces the problem that there is a large number of substantive rules that could theoretically explain the state-to-state variation in LLC popularity, yet there is no a priori criterion to determine which of these rules are relevant and which are not. For example, we can only guess which rule is more important to business organizers, one that requires a unanimous vote to dissolve the LLC, or one that gives minority LLC members a right to withdraw from the company. To deal with this issue, I took a two-pronged approach. First, I tested a large number of individual variables, selected those that were statistically significant, and included them in a model that explains the dependent variables best. (Because the dataset comprises only 51 observations, I could not test more than six independent variables in a single model. 13 my study.
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As Table 1 shows, if the 24 variables were random variables, the likelihood of finding one or more variables statistically significant by chance is quite high. As a second prong, I combined related variables to indices, which I describe at appropriate places in Part III of this study. The intuition behind this method is that a large number of favorable (or unfavorable) substantive-law provisions are more likely to affect LLC popularity than a single provision. When an index was statistically significant, I tested its components individually in order to see whether one of them drives the results alone. For that reason, the use of indices cannot avoid the problem of obtaining results that are significant by chance.
III. Findings and Implications
My most important finding is that it is formation fees, not taxes or substantive rules or anything else, that explain the variation in LLC popularity best. Table 2 presents a selection of regression models in which one or more independent variables were statistically significant. All models in Table 2 use the first dependent variable, LLCs over Domestic Corporations. Model (5) explains the variation in LLC popularity best. Models (1) to (4) and (6) are variations of that model.
37
This figure does not include alternative codings and index variables that compound several of the independent variables tested. The values of the variable "Formation fee differential ('low scenario')" equal the formation fee for an LLC minus the formation fee for a business corporation if the entity has paid-in equity of $10,000 or less.
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(with p<0.001) in all models tested. Hence, LLCs tend to be more popular in those states in which it is cheaper to form an LLC than a corporation and less popular in those states in which it is more expensive to form an LLC than a corporation. I will discuss this finding in Part III.A.
The variable "Statute contains 'freedom of contract' provision" (in short:
Freedom of Contract) is a dummy variable coded by Dammann and Schündeln, 39 which takes the value one for those 19 states whose LLC statute expressly provides that it is the statute's policy-or that the statute has to be construed-to give "maximum effect" to the principle of "freedom of contract," and zero for all other states. The variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable, and it was significant at p≤0.01 or p≤0.05 in all models tested. This means that LLCs are more popular in those states that have a "freedom of contract" provision than in those that do not. I will discuss this result in Part III.C. The variable "Member has default right to withdraw from LLC" (in short: Default Withdrawal Right) is the inverse of a dummy variable coded by Dammann and Schündeln.
40
It takes the value one for those 13 states in which an LLC member has a right to exit the company with or without notice and to be paid the value of the membership interest, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. The variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable, and it was significant with p≤0.01 or p≤0.05 in all models tested. In other words, LLCs are more popular in those states in which LLC members have a right to withdraw from the company, if the parties have not agreed otherwise. I will discuss this finding in Part III.B.1.
The variable "Unanimous vote required for transfer of management" (in short:
Unanimous Management Transfer) is a dummy variable that I coded, 41 which takes the value one for those 40 states in which an LLC may only transfer the right to manage the company with the consent of all of its members, and zero for all other states. The variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable and marginally significant (p≤0.10) in models (5) and (6), but it is not significant 39 Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 16, at 14 and 40 (naming the variable "Freedom"). 40 Id. at 9-10 and app. at 37 and 41-43 (naming the variable "Withdrawal"). For coding details see infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
in models that do not include the Freedom of Contract variable, such as models (3) and (4) in Table 2 ).
42
I will discuss this result in Part III.B.1. The variable "Modifications of agency powers in articles of organization" (in short: Agency Powers Modifications) is a dummy variable that I coded, 43 which takes the value one for those 21 states in which the powers to bind the company that LLC members have by statutory default may only be changed in the articles of organization, and zero for all other states. The variable is positively correlated with the dependent variable and significant (p≤0.05) in model (3), but not in model (4). I will discuss this finding in Part III.B.2.
The values of the last variable reported in Table 2 , "Proportion of firms in real estate and professional services sectors," equal the number of firms in the real estate sector (NAICS sector 53) 44 plus the number of firms in the professional services sector (NAICS sector 54), all divided by the total number of firms in a particular state.
45
The variable serves as a control variable because there are reasons to believe that the LLC form is particularly attractive to businesses in these two sectors for tax reasons. 46 However, the variable was not statistically significant in any of the models tested, and it did not affect the coefficients and the standard errors of the other variables to a notable extent.
I also tested models that use the two alternative dependent variables, LLCs over Domestic Entities and LLCs over Domestic and Foreign Corporations. The predictive power of these models, as measured by their R-squared values, is slightly lower than the predictive power of the models reported in Table 2, which   42 The variable is significant in other models (not reported in The reason is that these businesses may elect to be taxed as partnerships if they are organized as an LLC. If they are organized as a corporation, they may only elect to be taxed as S or C corporations. Partnership taxation is considered particularly attractive for these firms. use LLCs over Domestic Corporations as dependent variable. Hence, the predictive power of the variables reported in Table 2 does not depend greatly on how the popularity of LLCs is measured.
In the following sections, I discuss the findings reported in Table 2 as well as my other findings and their implications.
A. The Fee Paradox
Business entities cost money. These costs comprise, among other things, the fees for organizing the entity and keeping it active, and entity-level taxes that only business entities (but not individuals or sole proprietorships) have to pay. To test whether fee and tax differentials explain some of the variation in LLC popularity, I created two types of variables, Formation Fee Differential and Periodic Cost Differential. As the fee and tax burden sometimes depends on the size of a company, I calculated fee and cost differentials for three hypothetical companies of different sizes, resulting in a total of six fee and tax-related variables. The variables are my own calculations based on state statutes and fee schedules.
The values of the first type of variable, Formation Fee Differential, equal the fee for filing articles of organization of an LLC minus the fee for filing articles of incorporation of a business corporation. The values exclude recording fees as well as fees for the reservation of a company name and the registration of an agent because there is little transparency about whether business organizers can avoid these fees or not. The value for New York takes into account conservatively estimated costs of $500 for publishing a notice of LLC formation, which is a mandatory requirement in that state. 47 The values of the second type of variable, Periodic Cost Differential, equal the periodic fees and state entity-level taxes that an LLC has to pay every year minus the periodic fees and taxes that a business corporation has to pay each year. The values include annual or biennial report fees, other annual fees (e.g. renewal 47 The state of New York requires newly formed LLCs, but not corporations, to publish a notice of formation six times in two newspapers. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 206 (McKinney 2011) . Publication cost estimates range from $200 to $2,500, depending on the place and newspaper. See Blumberg Excelsior, New York LLC Formation Online, http://www.blankrupter.com/bio/ nyllcintro.aspx. According to a local small business law firm, publication costs range from $700 to $1,000 in New York City and from $295 to $1,250 elsewhere. See Brodsky Law Firm PLLC, LLC Publication, http://www.llcpublication.net/. In addition, the state imposes a 50$ fee on the filing of a certificate of publication. N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 1101(s) (McKinney 2011) . This fee is also included in the variable. fees), state franchise taxes and any other state entity-level taxes, but exclude taxes on nonresident LLC members. Annual report fees are flat rates in all but three states, in which they are based on the paid-in capital (South Dakota and Wyoming) or the number of members (Tennessee). 48 Those states that impose an income tax on business entities treat LLCs and corporations equally 49 because they recognize the election that businesses make for federal income tax purposes under the "check-the-box" regulation of 1997.
50
Those states that impose franchise taxes on LLCs and corporations base these taxes on receipts, net income, assets, equity, or the par value of stocks.
51
As mentioned, I calculated the formation fee and periodic cost differentials for three different scenarios. I defined these scenarios based on the IRS tax statistics in a way that the scenarios cover the range in which the median firm is likely to be found.
52
The "low" scenario is a company with domestic receipts of $25,000 per year, zero net income, assets of $50,000, paid-in equity of $10,000, and minimal par value of its certificates. For the calculation of filing fees, only the amount of paid-in capital is relevant to the definition of the "low" scenario because all states either charge flat-rate filing fees or base them on the paid-in capital.
of $150,000 per year, a gross income below $100,000, $5,000 net income, assets of $100,000, $20,000 in paid-in equity, and minimal par value. The "high" scenario is a company with 1 million dollars of domestic receipts, $250,000 gross income, $20,000 net income, $250,000 of assets, $100,000 of paid-in equity, and a par value of $100.
The formation fee differentials are identical in all three scenarios in 46 states. In three additional states, the scenarios differ by less than $50. 54 Table 3 sets out the formation fees and formation fee differentials for the "low" scenario. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, formation fees for LLCs and corporations differ by less than $100, and in twenty-one of them there is no differential at all. In contrast, LLC formation fees are substantially higher than corporate formation fees in New York (whose values include, as mentioned, estimated publication costs of $500), Illinois, Massachusetts, and Tennessee.
54
The three scenarios yield different filing fee differentials for the following states:
Scenario: "low" "med." "high "  Delaware  55  55  50  Missouri  42  42  7  Nebraska  50  10  -190  Nevada  0  0  -100  Oklahoma  50  50  0   20   Table 4 sets out the periodic fees and franchise tax differentials for the three scenarios. The differentials are smaller than $100 in most states and zero in 19 to 23 states, depending on the scenario. In some states, however, the differentials are substantial, reaching up to $2,000. The data in Table  3 and Table 4 reveal an interesting pattern. For instance, in the "low" scenario, LLC formation fees are higher than corporate formation fees in 22 states and lower in 8 states. Annual fees and taxes, however, are higher for LLCs than for corporations in 8 states and lower in 20 states. Hence, on average, LLCs tend to be more expensive to form than corporations, but cheaper to be kept active. As mentioned, the Formation Fee Differential variable in the "low" scenario is negatively correlated with LLC popularity and was highly significant, with p<0.001, in all models tested.
55
The coefficients were similar with p<0.001 as well when I used the two alternative dependent variables, LLCs over Domestic Entities and LLCs over Domestic and Foreign Corporations, and the "medium" and "high" scenarios. Depending on the firm-size scenario and the dependent variable used, formation fee differentials explain between 17% and 28% of the variation in LLC popularity. (2004) . Note: For a description of the "low, "medium," and "high" scenarios see supra text accompanying note 53. Rounded to the nearest dollar.
56
In contrast to the formation fee differentials, the Periodic Cost Differential variable tested insignificant in all models, regardless of the firm-size scenario and the dependent variable used. Hence, differences between LLCs and corporations in terms of periodic fees and franchise taxes do not explain the variation in LLC popularity. This result is surprising: Given that the formation fee differentials do explain the variation, one might expect periodic fee and tax differentials to explain some of the variation in LLC popularity as well-all the more because of the recurring nature of these duties. A potential explanation of this result is that the founders of LLCs and corporations are aware of the fees due at the formation of the entity, but not of the periodic fees and franchise taxes, when they choose between an LLC and a corporation. Since it is impossible to test hypotheses as to the behavior of individuals in a study that uses state-level data, 57 further study is needed in this regard.
My I found no relevant state-to-state variation in income tax treatment between the LLC and the corporation. 60 Thus, the variation in LLC popularity cannot be explained by the states' different tax treatments of LLCs.
B. The Dubious Significance of Substantive Rules
In addition to the substantive-law variables reported in the regression table  (supra Table 2 ), I tested a large number of other variables relating to substantive provisions found in LLC statutes. I report my findings in groups of variables starting with minority protection, followed by third-party protection, fiduciary duties, mandatory provisions, and small-business default rules. The index values equal the arithmetic mean of the values of these four variables and can thus take the values zero, ¼, ½, ¾, and one. The higher the index, the higher is the level of minority protection. The coding of the Default Withdrawal Right variable warrants discussion. As mentioned, the variable is based on a dummy variable coded by Dammann and Schündeln, who defined a withdrawal right for the purpose of their variable as an express rule (or set of rules) pursuant to which "(a) the member has the right to cease her membership by voluntary unilateral declaration, either immediately or after giving notice, (b) the company then has to pay the member the value of her membership interest either immediately or within a reasonable or otherwise limited period of time, and (c) the remaining members cannot prevent the withdrawing member from obtaining the value of her membership." See Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 16, at 10-11 and app. at 38 and 43-44 (naming the variable "Dissolution One"); id. at 8-9 and app. at 37 (naming the variable "Oppression One"). 63 Id. at 10. Conversely, it does not matter for the definition whether the withdrawal leads to a dissolution of the company or not (id. at 10), whether the right is called withdrawal, resignation or dissociation (id. app. at 41), or whether the withdrawing member has to give notice a certain period in advance (id. app. at 41). On the other hand, a formal right to withdraw does not fall within the definition if the withdrawing member will not be paid until the time he would be paid had he not withdrawn (id. app. at 42). For further coding details see id. app. at 41-43 and 52-54. 64 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 132-133 and app. at 140-141 (naming the variable "Withdraw"). The regression results in Table 2 Statute, were not statistically significant in any of the models tested.
Minority Protection
The Minority Protection Index is positively correlated with the popularity of the LLC, but it was only marginally significant (with p≤0.10) in some models and insignificant in others. These results, however, are driven by the Default Withdrawal Right variable. When this variable is excluded from the index, the index loses its significance. Thus, the data do not show that the level of minority protection, as a collection of rights, explains the variation in LLC popularity.
Given the large number of variables that I tested, I cannot rule out that the significance of the Default Withdrawal Rights variable is the result of chance. See supra text accompanying note 41. 68 See supra text accompanying note 37 and (Table 3A) , 122 (Table 3B) , 124 (Table 3C) , and 127 (Table  4 ). This result is hard to interpret, as their coding criteria are unknown. See supra text accompanying note 64. 71 See Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 16, at 17 (stating that an LLC may be forced into liquidation when it has to pay out a withdrawing member).
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Id. at 18 (stating that a withdrawal right may render membership interests in family firms ineligible for the so-called marketability discount in valuing their membership interest for gift and estate tax purposes because § 2704(b) of the Internal Revenue Code allows contractual restrictions on the right to liquidate the membership interest to be ignored). 73 See supra text following note 62. 74 Id. at 16 ( (Table 3A) , 122 (Table  3B) , 124 (Table 3C) , and 127 (Table 4) . factory way. In other words, whether a state statute offers minority LLC members strong or weak protections does not say much about the popularity of the LLC form in that state.
2.
Third-Party Protection I tested three dummy variables that encode statutory provisions aimed at protecting third parties who deal with an LLC, namely Agency Powers Modifications, Veil Piercing, and Member Disclosure. As explained, Agency Powers Modifications takes the value one if the power of LLC members to bind the company may only be changed in the articles of organization, and zero in all other cases.
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Since the articles of organization are public documents, such a rule creates transparency about who has the power to act on behalf of the LLC, and who has not. Thus, the rule protects third parties. The variable Veil Piercing is the inverse of a variable coded by Dammann and Schündeln. 77 It takes the value zero for those 36 states whose LLC statute explicitly shields LLCs from veil piercing in case of a failure to observe formalities, and one for all other states. Such a rule may adversely affect third-parties, as it limits creditors' ability to have the "LLC veil" pierced.
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The variable Member Disclosure 79 takes the value one for those 23 states that require member-managed LLCs to disclose publicly the identity of their organizers or their members, and zero for all other states. Public disclosure of the identity of LLC organizers or members may make it easier for creditors who believe that they have a personal claim against one of these persons to learn that person's identity.
I also combined the three dummy variables described above in a Third-Party Protection Index. The variable is the arithmetic mean of the values of the three dummy variables and serves as a proxy for the overall level of third-party protection that a LLC statute offers. The index can take the values zero, ⅓, ⅔, and one. The higher the index, the higher is the level of third-party protection.
As Table 2 shows, the variable Agency Powers Modifications is positively correlated with the dependent variable, but it is not in all models statistically significant. Veil Piercing and Member Disclosure were not significant in any of the 76 See supra text accompanying note 43.
77
Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 16, at 8, and app. at 39 and 46-47 (naming the variable "Formalities"). 78 See id. at 7-8.
79
I coded the variable based on a tablulation of state-law provisions concerning required disclosures compiled by RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app. 4-5. models tested. The Third-Party Protection Index was marginally significant in some models, and insignificant in others. The results of the index are driven by the variable Agency Powers Modifications. When this variable is excluded from the index, the index loses its significance. Hence, my results cannot be taken as evidence that LLCs are more popular in those states that protect third parties better.
These negative findings were not necessarily to be expected in light of the intuition that businesses prefer lax third-party protections, which would allow them to impose external costs on voluntary or involuntary creditors. Indeed, Dammann and Schündeln found that LLCs are more likely to be formed in the state of their primary place of business if that state prohibits piercing the LLC veil for nonobservance of formalities. 80 However, Kobayashi and Ribstein were unable to replicate this result in their study.
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My data likewise do not show a relationship between those third-party protections that I tested and the variation in LLC popularity.
One reason for the negative finding could be that provisions in LLC statutes that aim to protect third-parties do not have enough practical importance as to affect the popularity of the LLC form. For once, the statutory provisions might not be very effective. Alternatively, businesses may not have incentives to externalize costs on third parties even if no statutory protections were in place. Thus, for instance, an LLC may voluntarily honor a contract that one of its members has signed on its behalf in excess of his authority, 82 because the company could lose its reputation as a reliable business partner if it dishonored the contract. (Table 3A) , 122 (Table 3B) , 124 (Table 3C) , and 127 (Table 4) .
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For a policy analysis of different rules on the transparency of agency power restrictions of LLC members see David M. Deaton, Check-the-Box: An Opportunity for States to Take Another Look at Business Formation, 52 SMU L. REV. 1741 REV. , 1777 REV. -1778 REV. (1999 .
83
This argument is of course based on Stewart Macaulay's famous finding that, at least in local business relations, social relations are much more important to businesspeople than legal rights and duties. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AMER. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) .
3.
Fiduciary Duties I tested three dummy variables concerning the fiduciary duties of LLC members and managers. The first variable, Fiduciary Duties Waivable, was coded by Kobayashi & Ribstein and takes the value one for those 14 states that allow all fiduciary duties (i.e., the duty of care, the duty of loyalty and the duty of good faith) to be waived, and zero for all other states.
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The second variable, Duty of Care Modifiable, was coded by Dammann and Schündeln and takes the value one for those 40 states in which the duty of care can be waived or modified, and zero for all other states.
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The third variable, Gross Negligence, which was also coded by Dammann and Schündeln, takes the value one for those 23 states in which fiduciary duties are limited to grossly negligent or willful conduct, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, and zero for all other states.
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Based on these variables, I created a Fiduciary Duties Index, which reflects the degree to which fiduciary duties can be waived or modified. The index is an ordinal variable that takes the value three if all fiduciary duties (duty of care, duty of loyalty and duty of good faith) can be waived, two if only the duty of care can be waived or modified, one if fiduciary duties may not be waived, but are by default limited to grossly negligent or willful conduct, and zero if fiduciary duties may not be waived and are not limited to grossly negligent or willful conduct by default.
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None of the fiduciary duties variables were statistically significant in any of the models tested. In other words, the data show no connection between the 84 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 104-105 and app. at 138-139 (naming the variable "Fiduciary Waiver"). I revised the values for those three states whose statutes I read differently. California law refers to the law of partnerships in this matter (CAL. CORP. CODE § 17153 (West 2011)), which restricts the waivability of both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty (CAL. CORP. CODE § 16103(b)(3) and (4) (West 2011)). Utah and Wisconsin only allow contracting for higher liability standards than the statutory default. See UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2c-807(1)(c) (West 2011) and WIS. STAT. § 184.04203(3) (2011).
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See Dammann & Schündeln, supra note 16, at 13 and ann. at 39 and 45-46 (naming the variable "Care_Two_Alt"). 86 See id. at 12 and ann. at 39 and 44-45 (naming the variable "Care_One").
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The Fiduciary Duties Index is calculated from the three dummy variables just described as follows: 
4.
Mandatory Rules I created a Mandatory Rules Index to test whether some of the variation in LLC popularity could be explained by the rigidity of LLC statutes. I measure the rigidity of an LLC statute by the extent to which it contains mandatory rules, that is, rules that the parties may not override by contract. The index represents the arithmetic mean of nine variables, namely (1 
90
Index values may range from zero to one, in increments of one ninth. The higher the index, the more rules are mandatory. The Mandatory Rules Index is an imperfect measurement of the rigidity of LLC statutes because it does not contain all mandatory statutory provisions, and because it weighs all index components equally. However, there is no better measure for the rigidity of LLC stat- (Table 3A) , 122 (Table 3B) , 124 (Table 3C) It is also noteworthy that the index values are distributed normally, as one might expect the number of mandatory rules in LLC statutes to be.
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The Mandatory Rules Index was not statistically significant in any of the models tested. Thus, the data do not show a connection between LLC popularity and the rigidity of LLC statutes. This finding corresponds with Kobayashi and Ribstein's results, who found no connection between three mandatory rules and an LLC's likelihood to be formed in a state that is different from the state of their primary place of business.
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To explain this result, Kobayashi and Ribstein surmise that even mandatory provisions in LLC statutes may not be very restrictive. 94 Alternatively, a mandatory provision may not bother businesses because they would contract for the respective rule anyway. For instance, many LLC organizers might not have objections to a mandatory rule that gives each LLC member a veto over the transfer of management rights. If any of these explanations is pertinent, it is less of a surprise that the popularity of the LLC is unrelated to the prevalence of mandatory rules in LLC statutes.
5.
Small Business Default Rules I tested three dummy variables relating to default rules that can be assumed to fit the needs of small companies. Q. 369, 412-413 (1995) (arguing that member management suits the needs of small companies and discussing a number of objections to this hypothesis), and id. at 419-421 (arguing that per capita allocation of voting and financial rights suits the needs of small company because these arrangements correlate with member management and the restricted transferability of ownership interests and avoid valuation and record-keeping problems).
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The coding is my own based on RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app. 5-2 (tabulating default allocation of profits, losses and distributions).
states in which each of the LLC members has one vote unless members have agreed otherwise, and zero for all other states.
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The third dummy variable, Member Management, takes the value one for those 44 states in which LLCs are managed by all of their members unless members have agreed otherwise, and zero for all other states.
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I also combined the three dummy variables in a SmallBusiness Default Index. That index variable is the arithmetic mean of the values of the three dummy variables and can take the values zero, ⅓, ⅔, and one.
None of these variables were statistically significant in any of the models tested. Thus, my data show no connection between the popularity of the LLC and the content of default rules.
This result qualifies the importance of having optimal default rules in LLC statutes. Some authors assume that default rules in LLC statutes matter to business organizers, 99 and argue that the optimal default rule should suit the needs for small companies.
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Although this assumption is plausible, it is so far not supported by evidence. We can only speculate on the reasons for this lack of evidence. Transaction costs of contracting around a default rule might be low enough not to prevent people from organizing an LLC. The coding is my own based on RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app. 8-4 (tabulating the default allocation of member votes).
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The coding is my own based on RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, app. 8-2 (tabulating the default method of management).
99
See RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, at § 3:2 (citing drafting costs, information costs concerning potential contract provisions, and uncertainty about courts' willingness to enforce agreements that deviate from the statute as reasons); Friedman, supra note 8, at 42 (citing the fact that LLC default rules are more suited to small businesses than corporate default rules as an advantage). 100 The reason given by one group of scholars is that small companies are the largest numbers and most price-sensitive towards customized contracting. See Ribstein, supra note 95, at 374; similarly Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 17, at 98; RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 41, at § 3:2. Deaton argues that defaults should protect those parties who do not retain a lawyer when forming an LLC. Deaton, supra note 82, at 1768. This view arguably leads to the same result because larger businesses can be expected to be more likely to retain a lawyer when forming an LLC. 101 Cf. DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 150 (1994) Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 351, 383 and 399 (2003) (survey among 770 attorneys in four states, in which over two thirds of respondents confirmed the widespread use of form LLC agreements). A later survey among more than 500 lawyers in five states showed that lawyers are often asked to form "no-frills" LLC agreements. See Miller et al., supra note 14, at 622. easily available. 103 Under these circumstances, the content of default rules in LLC statutes might be practically irrelevant.
6.
Conclusions Substantive rules may be a key factor in entity choice from a lawyer's perspective, 104 but different substantive rules do not explain the variation in LLC popularity at state level very well. Most substantive law variables were either not significant at all or, in a few cases, only marginally significant. Only one of the substantive law variables, Default Withdrawal Right, was statistically significant and robust, but it is hard to explain why a default rule that gives LLC members a right to withdraw from the company would affect the popularity of the LLC, but none of the many other statutory rules. Furthermore, the indices that I tested were only significant to the extent that one of their component variables was.
Differences in substantive law may not explain the state-to-state variation in LLC popularity very well because some of the most important features of the LLC, such as limited liability, flexible taxation, 105 and the permissibility of singlemember LLCs, 106 are uniform across all states. Compared with these rules, the remaining state-to-state differences may be of secondary importance to business planners and may thus not affect their entity choice to an extent that would become apparent in the aggregate filing statistics.
C.
The "Freedom of Contract" Puzzle It is difficult to explain this finding in a convincing manner. Dammann and Schündeln, the creators of the Freedom of Contract variable, appear to have hypothesized that business organizers appreciate legislative commitments to contractual freedom. 112 This assumption seems intuitive, but it is difficult to identify the channels through which a freedom of contract provision would boost LLC popularity. If states use these provisions to signal a favorable business climate, one would not expect the LLC to be the only business form to benefit from it.
Moreover, the Freedom of Contract variable expresses a mere commitment to contractual freedom but does not necessarily reflect the actual degree of contractual freedom that the organizers of an LLC enjoy. Business organizers' actual freedom of contract is limited by the extent to which an LLC statute contains mandatory rules, which they may not override contractually. Therefore, one would expect the Mandatory Rules Index, which indicates how many rules out of a sample of nine rules are mandatory, to be negatively correlated with the popularity of the LLC. However, this is not the case.
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I also tested for interaction between Freedom of Contract and the Mandatory Provisions Index, but found none that was statistically significant. Thus, the explanatory power of the Freedom of Contract variable does not depend on the prevalence of mandatory provisions in an LLC statute. In other words, LLCs are equally more popular in those states whose statutes expressly endorse contractual freedom, no matter if these statutes have many or few mandatory rules. 114 An alternative explanation for the significance of the Freedom of Contract variable has less to do with contractual freedom as such than with legal certainty.
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Business organizers may worry that a couple of years down the road a judge might alter the contractual duties they had agreed upon in the articles of organization or in the operating agreement. Business organizers may view a "freedom of contract" provision as an assurance that courts will stick to the terms of the original contract and refrain from rewriting the contract. However, it is unknown whether business organizers or their attorneys are aware of "freedom of contract" provisions and believe that they have the desired effect on judges. Independently thereof, a "freedom of contract" provision may not be necessary to restrain judges from rewriting the LLC's founding documents because even those statutes that do not have an express "freedom of contract" provision do provide that the articles of organization or the operating agreement may include any provision that is not prohibited by law or (in the case of the operating agreement) by the articles of organization. The correlation between the popularity of the LLC and the Freedom of Contract variable may also be due to a confounding factor that is correlated with the Freedom of Contract variable. Such a factor is not easy to find, however. For instance, none of the many variables that I tested in this study are strongly correlated with the Freedom of Contract variable. It is noteworthy, though, that the "freedom of contract" provisions vary little from state to state.
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This suggests that state legislatures have copied them from other states that had enacted their LLC statutes earlier. It could be that they have copied other characteristics of the same statutes as well, which, in their entirety, are more attractive to business organizers than the statutes of other states. In other words, those LLC statutes that contain a "freedom of contract" provision might belong to a whole family of popular LLC statutes.
Last but not least, there is always the possibility that the significance of the Freedom of Contract variable is a random result.
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In light of the foregoing, it would be premature to deliver a definitive verdict on the puzzle that the predictive power of the Freedom of Contract variable presents. I leave it to future researchers to solve the puzzle.
D. What Does Not Explain the State-to-State Variation
43
thus bars creditors from managing the company or triggering its dissolution. 154 They created a dummy variable called Charging Order that takes the value one for those 23 states in which a charging order is an exclusive remedy for creditors of LLC members, and zero for all other states. 155 They did not find the variable statistically significant. 156 In my regression analysis, the Charging Order variable was likewise not significant in any of the models tested. The exclusivity of a charging order is perhaps a weak shield from creditors, because creditors could challenge the use of an LLC for debtor protection by other means.
157
E.
California's Ban of Professional LLCs LLC statutes do not vary greatly as to the kinds of businesses they allow LLCs to conduct. 50 LLC statutes either allow LLCs to be formed for any lawful business or prohibit a small range of specified businesses whose numbers are typically small, such as banks or insurance companies. 158 The one exception is California, which prohibits LLCs from providing professional services. 159 That state has an exceptionally low LLC-to-corporations ratio, too. For example, model (5) in Table 2 predicts for California an LLC-to-corporations ratio of 2.03, 160 yet the state's actual ratio is 0.87. California's residual is also the largest of all states in this model. It is unknown how many professional entities there are in California.
44 not greatly affect the overall popularity of the LLC.
162
Due to the lack of such data it is impossible to positively attribute California's low LLC-to-corporations ratio to its ban of professional LLCs.
F.
The Big Picture: LLC Popularity and the Wild West
The factors that explain the state-to-state variation in LLC popularity are reminiscent of the Wild West-hence the title of this study: 163 Money is important, legal rules are of dubious significance, and freedom is appreciated.
First, money is important. LLCs are more popular in those states in which it the fees for organizing an LLC are lower than the fees for organizing a corporation, and vice versa. With a pinch of salt, it seems that people tend to choose the entity that they can get "for a few dollars less." These formation fee differentials explain between 17% and 28% of the variation in LLC popularity. In contrast, the data show no relationship between the popularity of LLCs and differentials in annual fees and franchise taxes. This is all the more paradoxical as even one year's differentials in recurring fees and taxes tend to be larger than the formation fee differentials.
Second, like in the Wild West, legal rules are of dubious significance. I found only weak evidence that some of the substantive rules contained in LLC statutes explain the variation in LLC popularity. The only evidence that substantive law matters comes from a variable that indicates whether a state's LLC statute allows LLC members to withdraw from the company. Otherwise, the data show no connection between LLC popularity and the protection of minority LLC members and third parties, the flexibility that statutes offer in terms of fiduciary duties, the prevalence of certain mandatory rules, or the content of select default rules that presumably suit the needs of small companies. Against this backdrop, it is hard to explain why this rule, but none of the many other statutory rules, would affect the popularity of the LLC. One explanation for the mainly negative finding on substantive law is that the existing state-to-state differences in substantive LLC laws might not be important enough to affect entity choice to an extent that it would 162 I owe this suggestion to Prof. Lynn M. LoPucki. 163 become visible in the aggregate filing statistics. After all, the most important features of the LLC, such as limited liability, flexible taxation, and the permissibility of single-member LLCs, are the same in all states.
Third, (contractual) freedom is appreciated. More specifically, I find that LLCs are more popular in those states whose LLC statutes explicitly uphold the principle of contractual freedom. The respective variable is highly robust and explains about 10% of the variation in LLC popularity. If this is not a result by chance, it could be viewed as evidence that "freedom of contract" provisions reassure LLC members that courts will not rewrite their contracts in case of a lawsuit. Alternatively, "freedom of contract" provisions might be associated with other popular features of LLC statutes.
These findings were not necessarily to be expected. Although there has been anecdotal evidence that the variation in LLC popularity is associated with different levels of formation fees, the extent to which this is the case has been unknown hitherto. These fee differentials, which are relatively small but highly visible when a business entity is formed, explain more of the variation in LLC popularity than all the differences in substantive LLC law. Even more surprisingly, differentials in annual fees and entity-level taxes explain none of the variation! In other words, it is formation fees, not taxes or substantive rules or anything else, that explain the variation in LLC popularity best. This is the most important result of this study.
IV. Directions for Future Research
There are plenty of opportunities for future empirical research on LLC formations and entity choice. I commend four avenues of inquiry for the consideration of future researchers.
First, future research could explore the costs of organizing a business entity in more detail. A considerable part of the variation in LLC popularity can be explained by formation fee differentials. Yet formation fees are only part of organizing costs, which may also comprise lawyers' fees or fees charged by specialized firms that help people organize a company. Business organizers also incur information costs when they choose an entity. All of these costs may vary according to the type of entity, and these differentials may themselves vary from state to state. For instance, Friedman noted that lawyers in Illinois, which has the lowest LLC-to-corporations ratio in the country, seem to charge more for organizing an LLC than a corporation. 164 The availability of form LLC agreements could likewise differ from state to state. These kinds of costs may provide an additional explanation for the variation in LLC popularity. It would be interesting to analyze these form documents to see whether they modify non-optimal defaults, thereby creating private standard forms that supersede the default rules that LLC statutes provide. 165 Second, it might be worthwhile to explore the impact of local legal culture on entity choice. Local legal culture may be defined as "systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as a consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared by many practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and differing in identifiable ways from [other local legal cultures]." 166 For instance, there is a great deal of variation in consumer bankruptcy practices that cannot be explained but by different local legal cultures. 167 Relatedly, there is evidence that the attitudes of individual lawyers play an important part in explaining some of the variation in consumer bankruptcy practices. 168 The situation may be similar with regard to the choice of a business entity.
